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PHYSICAL POSSIBILITY AND DETERMINATE
NUMBER THEORY
SHARON BERRY
Abstract. It’s currently fashionable to take Putnamian model-
theoretic worries seriously for mathematics, but not for discussions
of ordinary physical objects and the sciences. However, I will argue
that (under certain mild assumptions) merely securing determinate
reference to physical possibility suffices to rule out the kind of non-
standard interpretations of our number talk Putnam invokes. So,
anyone who accepts determinate reference to physical possibility
should not reject determinate reference to the natural numbers on
Putnamian model-theoretic grounds.1
1. Introduction
In [17] and [16] Putnam uses the existence of unintended models for
our best scientific and mathematical theories to raise a challenge for
our ability refer to physical objects or a single intended natural num-
ber structure. It’s currently fashionable to take such model-theoretic
doubts about reference seriously in the mathematical case but assume
that analogous worries about the reference for physical vocabulary can
somehow be answered2.
2For example, this position is discussed in [3,10,14]. I find this combination of atti-
tudes is even more often held implicitly and acknowledged under questioning than
explicitly defended in print. Philosophers are often willing to advance Putnamian
model-theoretic arguments as reasons to doubt our ability to successfully refer to
intended mathematical structures, while feeling free to ignore them as far as talk
of physical objects and the necessity relevant to physical laws is concerned.
1
2 SHARON BERRY
In this paper, I will attack this combination of views. I will argue
that if we grant the realist determinate reference to certain physical no-
tions (including a notion of physical possibility3) and a certain physical
assumption holds, they can block Putnam’s model theoretic argument
that we can’t determinately refer to the standard model of the natural
numbers. So, philosophers who believe our physical vocabulary and
notion of physical possibility successfully refer should reject Putnam’s
argument that we can’t uniquely refer to the natural numbers4.
In section 2 I will set up the model-theoretic challenge to mathemat-
ical realism I want to consider. In section 3 I’ll review some limita-
tions and problems for previous work on (approximately) this topic by
Hartry Field and Vann McGee. In section 4 I will spell out my main
argument and finally in section 5 I will discuss some helpful variants
on this argument.
3 My argument would not work without this assumption of definite reference to
physical possibility, for the reasons Putnam points out on pages 469-470 of [17]. He
notes that merely citing our acceptance of certain counterfactual sentences don’t
suffice to block putnaminan unintended interpretation as follows, “Suppose we ‘first
orderize’ counterfactual talk, say, by including events in the ontology of our theory
and introducing a predicate (‘subjunctively necessitates’) for the counter-factual
connection between unactualized event types at a given place-time. Then our ar-
gument shows that a model exists which fits all the facts that will actually be reg-
istered or observed and fits our theoretical constraints, and this model induces an
interpretation of the counterfactual idiom (a ‘similarity metric on possible worlds’,
in David Lewis’ theory) which renders true just the counterfactuals that are true
according to some completion of our theory.”
4Note that I’m not arguing that the combination of, so to speak, physical determi-
nacy and number-theoretic indeterminacy is itself incoherent. I only claim to show
that if we assume determinate reference for certain pieces of physical vocabulary
then one specific (famous) argument that we can’t secure determinate reference to
the natural number structure is blocked.
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2. Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Challenge(s)
2.1. A Challenge for Physical and Mathematical Realists. Let’s
begin by considering Putnam’s model-theoretic challenge, as it applies
to the natural numbers.
From a naive realist point of view, it appears that we can refer to the
natural numbers (at least up to isomorphism). A natural place to look
for an explanation of our ability to refer to the natural numbers is our
beliefs about them. Thus, one might hope to appeal to our acceptance
of various statements of first-order number theory (plus our grasp of
various first-order logical connectives) to explain how our number talk
secures definite reference.
However, by the Lowenhiem-Skolem theorem, any first-order theory
which has an infinite model (as our first-order number theory must), has
models of different sizes. Thus, our mere beliefs about number theory
and grasp of first-order logical vocabulary cannot pin down reference
to the natural numbers. For example, the standard first-order Peano
Axioms of arithmetic (PA) plausibly articulate part of our concept
of numbers. But these axioms can also be satisfied by non-standard
models.
In light of the existence of such non-standard models, one can ask
(as Putnam does) the following question. Do we really have a definite
concept of the structure of the natural numbers, which is not satisfied
by the non-standard models? What can such a concept consist of?
What is it about us which (perhaps together with other kinds of facts
about the world) lets our words like “number” and “plus” take on
4 SHARON BERRY
meanings which rule out non-standard models? For reasons I won’t
discuss here, Putnam takes our ability to give standard meanings to
first-order logical vocabulary for granted in this challenge. I will follow
him in doing so.
Accordingly, we can dramatize Putnam’s challenge as follows. Imag-
ine an all-knowing perverse interpreter, who is dedicated to interpreting
our talk about the natural numbers in some unintended fashion while
preserving the meaning of our first-order logical vocabulary. And sup-
pose (as Putnam does in formulating his challenge) that this perverse
interpreter is free to use all of ordinary mathematics in their effort to
construct non-standard models for our talk of the natural numbers to
refer to.
Can we cite plausible constraints that our perverse interpreter must
honor which prevent her from giving an unintended interpretation of
our word ‘number’? Note that, by the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem
mentioned above, merely requiring she interpret first-order logical vo-
cabulary normally and make some set of first order axioms about the
natural numbers come out true (e.g., axioms extending PA or em-
bedding the numbers in a larger structure) couldn’t provide such a
constraint.
If we can give no satisfying answer to Putnam’s challenge then, per-
haps, we must give up the realist intuition that we can refer to the
standard model of the natural numbers. For example, we might allow
that our conception of the structure of the natural numbers is vague
and allows for a range of acceptable precisifications (corresponding to
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different non-isomorphic structures satisfying at least the Peano Ax-
ioms), analogous to the range of different acceptable personifications
of ‘bald’ and ‘heap’5.
Failure to answer Putnam’s challenge also raises a problem for the
common presumption that all statements of arithmetic (even ones we
can’t decide) have definite truth-values. For one thing, the most com-
mon way of accounting for such definite truth-values is through defi-
nite reference to the natural numbers. But, more directly, combining
Gödel’s Completeness and Incompleteness theorems [8] tells us that
any computably axiomatizable theory extending basic arithmetic (a
subsystem of Peano Arithmetic) — such as our first-order mathemat-
ical beliefs — will have models which disagree on the truth of some
number-theoretic claims. So, if we concede to the Putnamian skeptic
that every model of our first-order mathematical beliefs is an equally
acceptable precisification of our number concept, then we are forced to
also conclude that the truth-value of some number-theoretic claim is
indeterminate.
Of course, if one took our ability to employ full second-order quan-
tification (as the realist understands it) for granted, one could use our
acceptance of second-order Peano Arithmetic (a version of Peano Arith-
metic which replaces the first-order induction axiom schema with the
second-order induction axiom below) to explain what is wrong with
non-standard models of the natural numbers.
Induction Axiom: (∀X) [(X(0) ∧ (∀n)(X(n)→ X(S(n))))→ (∀m)X(m)]
5C.f. [7]
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For the non-standard models of PA guaranteed by Löwenheim-Skolem
and completeness arguments (discussed above) don’t satisfy this in-
duction axiom, if we take second-order quantification to range over all
possible subsets. However, our ability to pin down standard meanings
for second-order quantifiers is (prima facie) mysterious in just the same
ways as our ability to latch on to the standard model of the natural
numbers. So, this fact is not enough to banish Putnamian skeptical
worries on its own.
Putnam supplements this mathematics-specific worry with a more
general model-theoretic challenge to realist approaches to truth and
reference. Very crudely, the worry goes like this. From a naive realist
point of view, it seems that we can talk about physical objects and
grasp scientific concepts in a way that makes it possible for an ideal
scientific theory6 to be wrong. However, any consistent first-order the-
ory can be interpreted as speaking truly about (some of) the sets. So
why doesn’t our ideal scientific theory count as speaking truly of this
model? Why isn’t it more charitable to interpret us as speaking truly
of some of the sets rather than falsely of electrons and rabbits (and the
rest of the apparent subject matter of the theory)?
As noted above, many philosophers are inclined to take Putnam’s
model-theoretic worries about determinate reference in mathematics
seriously, while presuming that corresponding worries about reference
to physical objects and notions can somehow be answered. Perhaps
this difference in attitudes can be motivated by the abstractness of
6By ‘an ideal theory’, I mean a theory that would be accepted ‘in the ideal limit’
of scientific investigation.
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mathematical objects. One can invoke causal contact with the physi-
cal objects we seemingly refer to (cats and rabbits and electrons and
so forth) to help explain definite reference to physical objects. But,
since mathematical objects are generally taken to be causally inert,
we cannot do the same when answering Putnam’s challenge regarding
reference to mathematical objects.
I will criticize this combination of views in what follows. I’ll ar-
gue that (given certain mild physical assumptions) if we have definite
reference to certain physical notions (including physical possibility),
Putnam’s skeptical argument about the natural numbers is blocked.
2.2. Clarifying the Challenges. But first let me make a quick re-
mark about how I am understanding the Putnamian challenges intro-
duced above, and what it would take to answer them.
Like most philosophically interesting skeptical arguments, the Put-
namian challenge I’m concerned with in this paper doesn’t just high-
light the possibility of doubting some realist doctrine. Instead, it seems
to provide positive reason for doubt, arising from premises which the
realist accepts. It seems to reveal a tension within the realists’ own
total philosophical view.
Specifically, the Putnamian skeptic doesn’t just doubt that we can
determinately refer to mathematical objects/physical objects/causes
etc. and ask to be convinced. Rather they attempt to show that the
realist can’t internally coherently explain certain putative facts about
reference they believe in. Putnam shows that it follows from the real-
ist’s own views on set theory, that various nonstandard interpretations
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of our ‘natural number’ talk exist. He suggests that the realist can’t
adequately explain what’s wrong with these non-standard interpreta-
tions.
Accordingly, a realist answering this skeptical challenge may use their
whole physical, mathematical, and metasemantic theory. They may
non-question-beggingly employ terms like ‘set’, ‘standard model’ etc.
(and take these to refer unproblematically) in the meta-language when
giving this explanation. And they can use standard realist set theory
to reason about what interpretations exist (just as Putnam does). But,
of course, if no such explanation can be given, the Putnamian challenge
succeeds – giving us reason to doubt our ability to determinately refer
to these objects.
To help keep this dialectical situation clear, we can flesh out the
conceit of the perverse interpreter (suggested above) as follows7.
As before, we imagine the Putnamian skeptical challenge as a game
played between the realist and a perverse interpreter who attempts to il-
lustrate the inadequacy of the realist’s theory of reference. Specifically,
we will suppose that the perverse interpreter is dedicated to offering an
unintended interpretation of some third party’s speech, while the realist
tries to force the interpreter to give the intended interpretation. Call
this third party the speaker. The realist wins, i.e., succeeds in block-
ing the skeptical challenge8, if they can provide a principled reason for
7I take this conceit to be something like philosophical folklore.
8This is not to say that they succeed in rationally compelling the skeptic to become
a realist.
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rejecting each of the perverse interpreter’s unintended interpretations
of the speaker.
In doing this, the realist is permitted to use ordinary set theory and
model theory in the metalanguage to reason about what interpretations
are possible (just as the skeptic does in setting up the model-theoretic
challenge). They can talk about ω sequences and what standard vs.
nonstandard interpretations of the speaker’s number-theoretic talk ex-
ist. And they can use set theory, in an ordinary way, to reason about
these interpretations. But they cannot presume that the third person
whose definite reference is to be explained has any such capacity9.
9This point, that we can freely refer to standard models of the natural numbers
in the metalanguage when answering Putnam’s challenge connects to to standard
responses to (one interpretation of) Putnam’s infamous and debated ‘just more
theory’ argument in the philosophical literature.
In [16], Putnam supplements the core model-theoretic challenge sketched above
with a ‘just more theory’ response to philosophers who attempt o use causal theories
of reference to rule out unintended interpretations of our mathematical/scientific
vocabulary. You might try to say that your word ‘rabbit’ is better interpreted as
referring to rabbits than sets because you have causal contact with rabbits and not
sets. But (Putnam seems to suggest) to say this is just to point out that you accept
a certain further theory (apparently about the reference of your own words). And
this expanded theory can still be satisfied by a model that takes all of your terms
to apply only to sets.
I follow Lewis [12], Devitt [5], and many others in rejecting this argument (if it is
read as a development of the skeptical challenge articulated above) for the following
reason. It seems to confuse the claim that a person’s utterances of “rabbit” refer to
rabbits because these utterances have a certain causal relationship to rabbits and not
sets with the claim that they so refer because the person being interpreted accepts
a bunch of sentences (which appear to articulate a causal theory of reference).
But I won’t attempt to Lewis’ and Devitt’s arguments here. I simply want to
note that even if Putnam’s supplementary ‘just more theory’ argument fails (so
causal facts can in principle be relevant to explaining reference), we are left with
an interesting and troubling skeptical challenge, which has been very philosophi-
cally influential. For example, David Lewis, while rejecting the ‘just more theory’
argument takes Putnam’s core model-theoretic skepticism seriously enough that he
lists answering it as an important motivation for his theory of natural kinds [11].
That core challenge is my intended topic in this paper.
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I will argue that (under certain physical assumptions) if the above
skeptical challenge is answerable in the physical case, it is answerable
in the number theoretic case as well.
Accordingly, I will imagine a scenario where the realist has already
(somehow!) succeeded in blocking all unintended interpretations of the
speaker’s physical vocabulary. I will consider whether they can then
rule out the remaining perverse interpretations which associate their
number talk with some nonstandard model, while interpreting all the
above mentioned physical and physical possibility language standardly.
Specifically, I will identify a certain sentence which seems to follow
from claims central to our conception of the natural numbers — so
that it’s reasonable to expect (and I take it Putnam would grant) all
acceptable interpretations of the speaker’s number talk should make it
come out true. Then I will argue that the Putnamian skeptic can’t in-
terpret the speaker’s physical and logical vocabulary correctly (from a
realist point of view), but their number talk non-standardly while mak-
ing this sentence come out true. When doing this I will make a certain
plausible physical assumption (IRS) and draw on this assumption when
making the above argument. Note that, as IRS is only used as part of
the meta-language argument about what interpretations of the speaker
are possible, we may unproblematically assume mathematical realism
in stating it.
However, before I do that it’s first worth reviewing previous attempts
to answer this challenge.
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3. Contrast With Field and McGee
My proposal takes inspiration from a pair of existing explanations
of determinate arithmetical reference suggested by Hartry Field and
Van McGee. Field and McGee each attempt to use our definite ref-
erence to certain non-mathematical vocabulary to pin down a definite
interpretation (up to isomorphism) for our natural number talk.
One can think of my proposal as attempting to solve problems for
Field and McGee by combining elements from each story. However,
unlike Field and McGee, I’ll only be arguing for the dialectically im-
portant conditional that (under certain mild assumptions) ‘if we can
somehow secure definite reference to certain physical/metaphysical no-
tions, this suffices to rule out nonstandard interpretations of number
talk as well’. I won’t suggest that definite physical reference plays a role
in the only (or best) explanation for definite mathematical reference.
3.1. The Language Expansion Approach. In [14] McGee offers
an account of definite reference to the natural numbers which centers
on what he calls ‘open-endedness’10. Open-endedness is the idea that
we expect all instances of the first-order induction axiom schema to
continue expressing truths in any ‘logically permissible’ extension of
our language.
McGee argues (roughly11) as follows. Part of our current mathemat-
ical practice is the expectation (discussed above) that the induction
10See [15] for a related proposal.
11McGee’s actual proposal is somewhat more complicated, in ways that I claim
don’t affect any of the criticisms discussed here. See pgs. 56-68 of [14] for the
details I’ve elided.
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schema will remain true in all ‘logically permissible’ expansions of our
language. McGee suggests that this fact helps rule out non-standard
models as follows. Suppose (for contradiction) that some nonstandard
model M provided an acceptable interpretation of our terms ‘natural
number’, ‘successor’ etc. Then there could (in some sense) be a god
who can point to the non-standard model and introduce a term ‘smee’
which applies counter-inductively to it (i.e., ‘smee’ applies to a succes-
sor closed proper initial segment of the non-standard model12). If we
met such a god then we could logically permissibly extend our language
by adding the term ‘smee’ from their language to ours. In such a case,
we would still expect the induction axiom to hold for formulas involving
the term ‘smee’ which we got from talking to this god. Therefore, in-
terpreting us to mean a nonstandard model is unacceptable, because it
any such interpretation would fail to make an instance of the induction
schema (in some extended version of our language) come out true.
This proposal faces a number of worries and objections. First, it’s
prima facie unclear that it’s metaphysically possible for a god to in-
troduce a term like ‘smee’. For instance, it’s not clear how the god
could definitely refer to some proper initial segment of our non-standard
model13. What can the god do to secure reference in a way we cannot?
Are we to imagine a metaphysically impossible scenario where they fly
12That is, ‘smee’ applies to 0, and smee(n)→ smee(S(n), but ‘smee’ doesn’t apply
to every (supposed) ‘natural number’
13Field writes, “why can’t we just say that we secure definite reference by whatever
we are imagining the god to do to secure her reference?” [7] in a criticism of McGee.
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into the realm of abstract objects and point to each of the infinitely
many elements in the initial segment one by one?14.
But McGee tries to head off all such concerns by appealing to the
idea that we are committed to the first-order induction schema being
true in all logically possible extensions of our language (whether these
are metaphysically possible or not). He writes:
To say what individuals and classes of individuals the
rules of our language permit us to name is easy: we are
permitted to name anything at all. For any collection of
individuals K there is a logically possible world - though
perhaps not a theologically possible world - in which
our practices in using English are just what they are
in the actual world and in which K is the extension of
the open sentence ‘x is blessed by God’. So the rules
of our language permit the language to contain an open
sentence whose extension is K [14].
But, this insouciance comes with a cost. For appealing to something
like a speaker’s positive intention/determination that instances of the
induction schema will continue to express truths under ‘all logically
possible (and logically permissible) extensions of our language’ to ex-
plain how we have a determinate conception of the natural numbers
is arguably question-begging. We wouldn’t accept an answer to Put-
nam’s worries that just presumed the speaker being interpreted had
14Perhaps we could imagine the god verbally providing a definite description of each
object they take to be a ‘natural number’ in some finite stretch of time in the way
discussed in the literature on supertasks [13] and then saying ‘that’s all’. Thanks
to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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a determinate conception of second-order quantification. And it’s not
clear assuming the speaker can determinately refer to all logically pos-
sible expansions of their language, so as to explicitly form an intention
to continue accepting all instances of the induction schema, is materi-
ally different. If we can somehow determinately refer to the full range
of logically possible expansions of our language (where the latter are
expected to witness ‘all possible ways of choosing’ some objects for a
predicate to apply to), why can’t they use the same faculty to directly
intend that our second-order quantifiers range over every possible sub-
set?15
Instead, it might be better to interpret McGee’s proposal differently
(in line with his playful use of slogans like ‘ignorance is strength’), as
advocating a kind of negative path to determinate mathematical refer-
ence. The idea is that we commit ourselves to continued acceptance of
induction under all logically possible (logically permissible) language
expansions by simply being disposed to continue accepting instances of
the induction schema after (logically permissible) language extensions
without further doubts or checking that other conditions are satisfied.
However, it seems to me that much more would need to be said to
develop this picture. For example, one might dispute whether (and
wonder why) having the above disposition commits one to accepting
all instances of the induction schema after all logically possible logically
permissible language changes rather than, e.g., merely all metaphysi-
cally possible ones.
15See [3], [18] [6].
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One might also worry about whether we can rigorously cash out
McGee’s notion of ‘logically permissible’ extensions of our language 16.
My argument will avoid both of these problems. For it makes no
claims about ‘all logically permissible expansions of our language’, so
it’s not on the hook for clarifying this concept. And it won’t presup-
pose that speakers can think about or otherwise commit themselves to
accepting sentences in ‘all logically possible scenarios’ (or any meta-
physically impossible scenarios at all).
3.2. Appeal to the Structure of Time. In [6] Hartry Field (rather
ambivalently) proposes a different way of using physical reference to
pin down reference to a unique intended natural number structure. In
effect, he argues as follows. Assume that the evenly spaced points in
time (starting from some specified point) form a genuine ω sequence17
(i.e., time has infinite duration and there are only a finite number
of seconds between any two times). Now consider a speaker who ac-
cepts (a sentence that seems to express) this claim. Field suggests
that nonstandard interpretations of this speaker’s natural number talk
(which interpret talk of points in time and certain temporal relations
correctly) can be ruled out on the grounds that they must make this
16Sometimes, rather than talking about all logically permissible expansions of con-
temporary English, McGee talks about all expansions of English which are per-
mitted by the rules of current English noting that, “the rules of English certainly
permit the adjunction of additional vocabulary; indeed, we add new singular terms
to the language whenever we baptize an infant or bring a new puppy home from the
pound, and we add new general terms whenever we devise a new theory, discover
a new species, or introduce a new product line.” [14]
17As usual, I’ll take the claim that some plurality of objects ‘forms an ω sequence’
to mean that this plurality of objects (when considered under some relation <), is
isomorphic to the natural number structure. So, for example it has a first element,
the successor of that element and so forth.
16 SHARON BERRY
sentence come out false. However, Field’s story has some limitations
and also raises some concerns, which my account will avoid.
First, Field’s story only pins down definite mathematical reference
for people who happen to truly believe that time has a certain struc-
ture. It doesn’t explain how people who keep an open mind about this
matter of cosmology could refer to the natural numbers. In contrast,
my story won’t require that the people whose reference is to be ex-
plained have any beliefs about contingent physics18. Thus, it will let
us defend realist intuitions that even the cosmologically open-minded
can definitely refer to the natural numbers.
Second, Field’s story requires the assumption that time actually has
a certain structure (mirroring that of the intended model of the num-
bers, as specified above) 19. In contrast, my argument won’t require
that the actual laws of physics privilege the standard model of the
numbers. Instead, it will merely require that a certain kind of infinite
sequence of random events is physically possible. And in section 5, I will
discuss some ways in which even this contingent physical assumption
can be dropped.
Third, it’s not clear that the mere fact that a speaker’s cosmolog-
ical hypothesis will come out false if we interpret their number talk
non-standardly lets us rule out such interpretations as inappropriate.
18It will only require they accept that (a certain instance of) the induction schema
for the natural numbers holds with physical necessity (plus some other similarly
conceptually central/quasi-analytic principles about counting, which I list below).
19To bring out the weightiness of this assumption, note that physical theories on
which spacetime is finite – in the sense relevant to Field’s principle – have been
seriously considered (c.f. [19] and [9] chapter 8). Perhaps one could even make
sense of time having epochs structured like the nonstandard numbers.
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Certainly, most people wouldn’t say that it’s part of what they mean by
‘the natural numbers’ that the natural numbers must have a structure
that mirrors the structure of time (in the sense described above). And
surely, it’s sometimes correct to interpret someone as holding a false
belief. And this claim doesn’t seem particularly conceptually central
(the kind of thing any charitable interpreter must assign high priority
to interpreting as expressing a truth).
More importantly, requiring all acceptable interpretations of a per-
son’s number talk to make their cosmological hypotheses (like the one
above) come out true suggests the following counterintuitive conse-
quence. If time in our world had had a nonstandard structure20 then
(even if we had no evidence of this fact) our number talk would have
determinately referred to a nonstandard model.
In contrast, my approach will follow McGee in appealing to a much
more conceptually central aspect of our understanding of the natural
numbers — the idea that it would be metaphysically and physically
impossible for an instance of the induction schema (applied to physical
objects) to fail — which would be violated if our natural number talk
didn’t refer to the standard model. This lets us avoid the unappealing
idea that, if the physical laws had been undetectably different (while
all our experiences and utterance dispositions remained the same) our
number talk we would have determinately referred to some nonstandard
model.
20In talking about scenarios where ‘time has a nonstandard structure’, I mean
to consider scenarios in which the evenly spaced moments (e.g., the ticks of a




With all this background in place, I will now argue for the core thesis
of this paper: if a certain plausible physical assumption holds and
we have intended realist reference to certain physical notions, we can
resist Putnam’s argument against determinate reference to the intended
natural number structure.
Remember that, as I outlined above, our goal is to identify a sentence
P COIN INDUCT that (unlike the cosmological hypothesis used in
Field’s account) is treated as sufficiently central to our conception of
‘the natural numbers’ that interpretations of our number talk can plau-
sibly be ruled out for failing to make this sentence come out true. I’ll
argue that (given a plausible physical assumption) no interpretation
makes P COIN INDUCT come out true while interpreting all physi-
cal and logical vocabulary as the realist intends, and our number talk
as referring to some nonstandard model of PA.
More specifically, the structure of this argument will be as follows:
• Identify a claim COIN INDUCT whose physical necessity is
treated as sufficiently conceptually central that failing to make
PCOIN INDUCT (where P is a physical necessity operator)
come out true can rule out candidate interpretations of our
‘number’ talk21 Specifically, COIN INDUCT will conjoin the
following (first-order English) claims.
21This is not to say that all acceptable interpretations must make all sentences
treated as central to the speaker’s conception of some concept come out true. If
the collection of seemingly conceptually central truths about the numbers were in-
coherent so that no interpretation could make them all come out true, the situation
would be different .
PHYSICAL POSSIBILITY AND DETERMINATE NUMBER THEORY 19
HEADS INDUCT: An instance of the first-order induc-
tion schema as applied to the property Q(n) asserting that
there is an n-th coin flip and it landed heads.
COUNTING RULES: A collection of conceptually cen-
tral principles like ‘For all objects x and numbers n, if
x is the n-th coin flip, then x is a coin flip.’
PA−: The usual Peano Axioms of arithmetic without the
induction schema.
• Identify (by stating in the meta-language) and make a certain
plausible assumption about what’s physically possible (IRS).
• Note that if IRS holds then no non-standard interpretation of
the speaker’s number talk can make pCOIN INDUCT come
out true, while interpreting their expression ‘p’ and certain
other physical vocabulary as the realist intends.
• Conclude that (if this plausible physical assumption holds) the
speaker’s securing definite realist reference for all their physical
vocabulary would suffice to block all Putnamian nonstandard
interpretations of their ‘number’ talk.
In a sense, my proposal will use the fact that it’s physically possible
for any subset of an infinite independent sequence of coin flips to land
heads to take the place of second-order quantification in ruling out
nonstandard models of number theory.
4.1. Assumptions. To more rigorously develop the argument above,
let me first give a definition of the kind of interpretations at issue in
this argument. This definition simply cashes out the idea that we’re
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taking definite reference to physical necessity for granted and imposes
some basic constraints on our would-be perverse interpreter.
I will say that an interpreter is well behaved just if they satisfy the
following criteria:
• They select a single model as the referent of our concept ‘natural
number’ in all physically possible worlds.
• They don’t tamper with the extension of physical vocabulary
like ‘coin flip’, ‘landed heads’ or ‘temporally before’ at any of
these possible worlds.
• They interpret all first-order logical vocabulary and the phys-
ical necessity operator standardly. So, for example, they will
take the speaker’s existential quantifier and the physical neces-
sity operator p to contribute to truth conditions in the usual
fashion.
• They interpret all sentences we treat as conceptually central to
our understanding of the natural numbers22 (on par with the
Peano Axioms) as expressing truths.
4.2. Conceptually Central Claims. To introduce the key sentences
at issue, consider how we use numbers to talk about temporally (or
otherwise) ordered sequences of events. We talk about, ‘the 4th U.S.
President’, ‘the 37th successful rickrolling’, or ‘the 3rd coin flip (in the
history of the universe)’.
22Note that being conceptually central in the sense at issue here does not require
being indubitable and could be a matter of degree [20].
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Given a type of physical event, ‘coin flip’ 23, we (and hence the
speaker) have, or can easily define24, a relation ‘countflip(n,x)’ between
coin flip events and events, which holds when ‘x is the n-th coin flip’
(counting from 0). We take this relation to relate 0 to the temporally
first coin flip event in the history of the universe (if there is one)25, 1
to the temporally next coin flip event and so on. Speaking in these
terms, we (and hence the speaker) take the following claims to hold
with physical (and indeed metaphysical) necessity.
• An object x is the 0th coin flip, iff x is a coin flip and all other
coin flips happen after x26.
• If x is the nth coin flip, then y is the n + 1-th coin flip iff y
occurs after x and no other coin flip occurs between x and y 27.
• Only coin flips can be the nth coin flip28.
23See the discussion of infinite random sequences below for more detail about how
I want to understand this notion.
24Admittedly for the purpose of general logical analysis of language, we’ll probably
want to formalize ordinary counting claims in a more abstract way. For we’ll want
to account for our ability to say ‘there’s a 17-th x such that φ(x) (considered
under ordering ρ)’ for infinitely many different predicates φ (and ordering ρ) while
speaking a finitely learnable language.
25In some cases which coin flip counts as the temporally first one may be relative
to a choice of a reference frame, but this complication poses no difficulty. We may
simply work relative to some foliation or, alternatively, restrict our attention to
those possible worlds in which there is a unique first coin flip.
26That is, (∀x)[countflip(0, x)↔ coinflip(x)∧(∀y)(countflip(y)→ before(x, y)∨
x = y))]. Here I count up from 0 rather than 1, for the sake of simplicity. Also, by
writing this formula with 0, I abbreviate the corresponding claim about the unique
object satisfying some definite description of 0 in terms of N, S, e.g., ‘the unique
object that has a successor but isn’t a successor’.
27That is,
(∀n)(∀x)(∀y)(N(n) ∧ countflip(n, x)→ [(countflip(S(n), y)↔
coinflip(y) ∧ before(x, y) ∧ (∀z)¬ (coinflip(z) ∧ before(x, z) ∧ before(z, y))]
28That is (∀x)(∃n)(countflip(n, x)→ coinflip(x)).
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• No two distinct numbers correspond to the same coin flip 29.
Call the conjunction of all the principles above COUNTING RULES.
Then, I take it, P COUNTING RULES is (or follows from) principles
treated as ‘conceptually core’ truths, which (just as much as the Peano
Axioms) all acceptable interpretations of our ‘number’, ‘coinflip’ and
‘countflip’ talk must satisfy30.
Second, we take induction to hold for all predicates in our language,
including Q(n) “there is an n-th coin flip, and the n-th coin flip comes
up heads,” Q(n)
def
= (∃x)(countflip(n, x)∧heads(x)). And we can state
an instance of the induction schema for Q(n) as follows.
(HEADS INDUCT)
Q(0) ∧ (∀n) [Q(n)→ Q(S(n))]→ (∀n)[N(n)→ Q(n)]
Indeed, we think it’s (logically, physically, and metaphysically) im-
possible for any property to apply to 0 and the successor of every
number it applies to without applying to all numbers. So we and the
speaker will both take HEADS INDUCT to hold with physical neces-
sity.
So let me define COIN INDUCT to be the conjunction of the induc-
tion schema for Q(n) (the n-th coin flip landed heads) and the rules
for counting coin flips. That is,
29That is (∀n)(∀m)(coinflip(n, x) ∧ coinflip(m,x)→ m = n)
30Of course, to say that COUNTING RULES is a conceptually central truth for
us isn’t to say that in some other context or language we couldn’t instead start
counting coin flips from 1 rather than 0. Also, I’ve only suggested the above as
conceptually central principles for counting all coin flips. One could obviously count
all coin flips after Tuesday as well and we’d have to modify COUNTING RULES
if we wished to describe counting those events.
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(COIN INDUCT) HEADS INDUCT ∧ COUNTING RULES ∧ PA−
I take it that P (COIN INDUCT) is (or follows from) principles which
we (and hence the speaker) treat as conceptually core. The Putnamian
skeptic allows that any acceptably charitable interpretation must make
the axioms of Peano Arithmetic true. And it seems equally clear that
any acceptable interpretation must make P (COIN INDUCT) come
out true. For this principle simply says that (an instance of) natural
number induction and certain seemingly analytic truths about counting
coin flips hold with physical necessity.
This completes my identification of the specific object language sen-
tence (P COIN INDUCT) whose truth our well-behaved interpreter
can’t guarantee while interpreting our number talk non-standardly.
4.3. Infinite Random Sequences. Now let’s turn to the task of
showing (by set theoretic reasoning in the meta-language) that our
perverse interpreter can’t make P COIN INDUCT true while obey-
ing the rules above without interpreting number talk standardly. My
argument begins with the following plausible, though not indubitable,
physical assumption.
Infinite Random Sequence Assumption (IRS): It is phys-
ically possible to have a series of independent objectively
random events with two possible outcomes and the fol-
lowing combination of features. The events are linearly
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ordered in time31, there’s a first event but no final event
and every event in the series has a temporal successor,
i.e., for any event x there is some other event y occur-
ring after x such that no event z occurs between x and
y.
Informally, one can think of the events whose possibility IRS asserts
as being like the ticks of an indestructible watch which never needs
repair or winding. There is a first tick, each tick is followed by a
unique next tick, and there is no tick after which the watch breaks
down.
To motivate this principle, note that it is only asserting that it is
physically possible to repeatedly perform (independent) textbook spin
measurements on an electron32 [1] or some other equivalent process.
Also, plausibly, the laws of physics don’t rule out time continuing in-
finitely into the future (though possibly having non-standard ‘length’).
I will abstract away from all details about these objectively random
events in what follows, and simply refer to each event as ‘a coin flip’
and the two outcomes as ‘heads’ and ‘tails’33.
31That is, for any distinct events x, y in the series, either x occurs before y or
y occurs before x. Moreover, from the point of view of relativistic physics, the
measurements are separated by time-like intervals (x is in the future light cone of
y or vice versa) so all observers agree on their order. Given these constraints, it is
safe to simply work relative to some foliation and ignore relativistic complications
for the remainder of the paper. Thanks to Peter Gerdes for help developing this
point and other details about physics.
32That is, perform a spin measurement along the x-axis on an electron whose spin
has just been measured (and thus collapsed) along the y-axis.
33Even if you are not convinced that infinite random sequences of the kind discussed
above are physically possible, they are surely plausible enough that it’s uncomfort-
able for any philosophical view to be committed to ruling them out a priori. Also
note that ultimately I will only use IRS to establish that it’s physically possible for
the events satisfying some physical predicate (having a determinate extension) in
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Finally, note that we might need to use mathematical vocabulary to
state the probability and independence claims in IRS. As discussed in
§2.2, I don’t take this to be a problem for a realist aiming to defend
herself from Putnamian skepticism. For I will only be appealing to
the assumption IRS (and using the mathematical vocabulary needed
to state it) in the metalanguage, to argue that that certain perverse
interpretations of the speaker are impossible.
To put the point another way, while we (working in the metalan-
guage) might use mathematical language, my argument only assumes
that the speaker can successfully refer to the full range of physical
possibilities with their ‘It is physically possible that...’ operator34.
4.4. Ruling out Nonstandard Models. With these to bits of back-
ground in place, we can finally foil the (well behaved) perverse inter-
preter.
By our assumption IRS, there’s a physically possible world wω where
infinitely many independent random coin flips (linearly ordered by the
relation ‘ is temporally before’) take place. This sequence of coin flips
need not itself form an ω sequence (from the point of view of our
background set theory), but it has an initial segment which does35. By
our current language to form an ω sequence (with the relation of ‘temporally before’
playing the role of <). So readers who already accept this claim could replace IRS
with a direct assertion of the physically possibility of such a physically definable ω
sequence. However, I feel IRS provides compelling reason to accept this conclusion.
34Note that it might take quite different mathematical resources to refer to the
notion of physical possibility (as needed to ask questions about whether it would
be physically possible for a pig to fly, or for there to be a perpetual motion machine)
vs. to state a scientific theory which picks out the set of physically possible worlds
in some other terms.
35Using ordinary background set theory to reason about what models and inter-
pretations exist just as Putnam does, we can prove that any infinite discrete linear
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the independence and randomness of the coin flips, it follows that there
are physically possible scenarios corresponding to all combinatorially
possible outcomes for each coin flip.
So there’s some physically possible world wω, where exactly an initial
ω sequence of these coin flips come up heads.
However, we can now show that our constraints on the perverse inter-
preter ensure that she takes Q(n)
def
= (∃x)(countflip(n, x) ∧ heads(x))
to hold for just those n in the standard initial segment of the nonstan-
dard referent of the natural numbers – so she’s forced to say HEADS
INDUCT comes out false at this world.
Importantly, we can show this by an argument doesn’t question-
beggingly assume that the speaker can somehow pick out and refer to
worlds at which only an initial ω sequence of coin flips come up heads.
It only requires that the speaker can secure definite realist reference
for the physical vocabulary ‘coin flip’, ‘heads ’ etc. mentioned above
(at the actual world and a suitable range of physically possible worlds)
and P , while P COIN INDUCT as a conceptually central truth.
We can show, as follows, that no interpretation (recognized by our
background set theory) can make HEADS INDUCT, COUNTING RULES
and PA− come out true at wω, while taking ‘coinflip()’, ‘heads()’ and
before() to have their intended extension, but number talk to apply to
some nonstandard model at wω.
Consider how one can interpret ‘countflip()’ as applying to this
world wω, where exactly the initial ω sequence of coin flips comes up
ordering with least element (by IRS), includes an initial ω sequence. For this reason
every model of PA− also includes an initial ω sequence.
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heads. To satisfy the principles governing ‘countflip()’ in COUNTING
RULES, 0 has to be assigned to the temporally first coin flip in wω, 1
to the next, and so on, for all the objects in the standard initial seg-
ment of the nonstandard model (note that every nonstandard model
of PA− has a standard initial segment). This ‘uses up’ all the coin
flips landing heads. Since, by COUNTING RULES ‘countflip()’ pairs
‘numbers’ with coin flips 1-1, no coin flip can be reused.
Accordingly, a perverse interpreter must take ‘countflip()’ pair all
and only the ‘true’ (i.e., standard) natural numbers with coin flips land-
ing heads. Thus, their interpretation must make ‘Q(0)’ and ‘whenever
Q applies to some number n it also applies to Q(n + 1)’ true. But as
their interpretation takes ‘the numbers’ to refer to a larger structure
than this standard initial segment, it follows that their interpretation
also makes ‘∀nQ(n)’ false. Thus, their interpretation renders HEADS
INDUCT false at this physically possible world, and hence p COIN
INDUCT false (full stop).
So, to summarize, if IRS is true then (provided ‘coinflip()’, ‘heads()’
and before() have their usual interpretation), either ‘natural number’
is interpreted standardly or some part of COIN INDUCT doesn’t hold
with physical necessity.
5. Generalizing the point by dropping/changing some
assumptions
So much for my core argument. Above I have argued that (given the
plausible physical assumption IRS mentioned above) one cannot inter-
pret physical vocabulary standardly and number talk nonstandardly
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without making some applied mathematical sentences we treat as ob-
vious conceptual truths about the natural numbers come out false. Let
me end by pointing out some quick correlaries and generalizations.
First, the argument above works just the same if we replace appeal
to physical possibility p with an appeal to metaphysical possibility
m. And it is surely metaphysically possible for there to be an infi-
nite random sequence of independent coin flips (as per IRS). So, if you
assume that we (somehow) have a determinate realist grasp on meta-
physical possibility and the basic physical vocabulary above, this also
suffices to block the Putnamian skeptic’s argument36.
Second, we don’t need to assume possession of a completely deter-
minate notion of physical/metaphysical possibility for the argument
above. It’s fine if our conceptions of the limits of physical/metaphysical
possibility are underspecified in various ways – provided that all accept-
able precisifications of these notions agree in classifying some world like
wω as physically possible. And this is something which many existing
reasons for thinking that our notions of physical/metaphysical possi-
bility aren’t fully definite don’t call into question.
Third, we might be able to eliminate premises about determinate
reference to physical/metaphysical possibility from my argument all
together, by instead appealing to the idea that principles of charity [4]
favor making speakers out to be rational/justified as well as attributing
36We could also make a similar argument without appealing to the notion of random
events at all. We could just appeal directly the intuition that (from a realist point of
view) it would be metaphysically possible for there to be an ω sequence of coin flips
which came up heads. This seems strongly motivated by the intuition that infinite
collections of some kind are physically possible plus general Humean Recombination
intuitions.
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them more true beliefs. For, (arguably) if we don’t interpret people to
be talking about the standard model of the natural numbers, then
their (approximately) a priori confidence in instances of the induction
schema will look like unjustified dogmatism. The existence of physical
ω sequences as in world wω, seems like something we shouldn’t rule out
a priori. But (by the argument above) any nonstandard interpretation
of our number talk would make induction fail in this epistemically
possible scenario.
So accepting principles like COIN INDUCT as necessary truths know-
able a priori 37, looks rational on a standard interpretation of the num-
bers, but irrational on any nonstandard interpretation of our number
talk38.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that if we have determinate realist
reference for certain pieces of physical vocabulary, Putnamian model
theoretic arguments that we can’t determinately refer to the natural
numbers are blocked. Specifically, I have argued that (given certain
plausible assumptions), merely securing determinate reference to phys-
ical possibility and certain other physical concepts suffices to rule out
all non-standard models of our number-theoretic talk as well.
Let me close with three notes of humility. First (as noted above),
I don’t claim to have answered Putnam’s challenge or explained how
37Here I mean to refer to our a priori confidence in pCOIN INDUCT.
38See [2] for development of an idea along these lines in a different philosophi-
cal context (attacking certain anti-realist views, rather than answering Putnamian
skepticism).
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we can determinately grasp mathematical concepts. I have only ar-
gued for a (dialectically important) conditional claim. If one could
somehow answer Putnam’s challenge regarding physical concepts, this
would provide a principled reason for rejecting nonstandard interpre-
tations of our number talk as well. I’ve provided no argument that we
should respond to this fact by rejecting Putnam’s arguments against
physical and number-theoretic determinate reference rather than, e.g,
taking them to succeed in both cases.
Second, remember that Putnam’s model theoretic argument seemed
to identify an internal problem for the realist. He notes that, even
from the realist perspective (i.e., granting use of familiar realist set
theory in the metalanguage) certain perverse interpretations exist, and
challenges the realist to explain what makes all the unintended inter-
pretations wrong. I’ve argued that, if certain assumptions hold, this
challenge can be answered; we can internally coherently explain what’s
wrong with all the unintended interpretations our background set the-
ory acknowledges. However, this doesn’t prevent fans of determinate
physical reference from rejecting determinate reference to the natural
numbers for some other reason than Putnam’s model theoretic argu-
ment.
Third, although I have argued that (if we can somehow definitely
refer to it) leveraging physical possibility and accepting principles like
p(COIN INDUCT) offers a route to grasping a definite concept of
the natural numbers, I don’t mean to suggest that this is the only or
primary way that we can grasp such a concept. For another thing, it
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would be strange if our possession of a definite conception of the natural
number structure depended on our beliefs about physical (or metaphys-
ical) possibility. Thus, I suspect that another - rather different- style
of answer to Putnam’s challenge must also be possible.
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